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At her criminal trial, Gerst alleged that
to apply the antitrust laws 'prudently and
exception to the per se rules of antitrust
she withdrew the cash at the request of
with sensitivity,' with a 'special soliciliability. Id.
tude for the First Amendment rights' of
Samuel Hill, a partner in the firm, and
The impact of this decision is substan[the SCfLA)." Id. (quoting Superior
then turned the money over to him. This
tial. Previously, the notion of a boycott
Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n. v. F. T. C, 856
conflicted with Hill's testimony that
had been an agreement among the parF.2d at 233-34). Thus, the court of apwithdrawals from the account were alticipants to refrain from engaging in cerpeals shifted the burden to the FfC to
lowed by internal paper transfer only,
tain activities in order to bring about a
show that the boycotters possessed sufand denied ever authorizing cash withchange. It was thought that this type of
ficient market power to warrant a per se
drawals or receiving any cash from Gerst.
agreement was protected by the first
violation of the antitrust laws.
After a three-day jury trial, Gerst was
amendment because it was a form of
The Supreme Court, however, found
acquitted.
expression. Now, if such an agreement
the court of appeals' analysis to have
Thereafter, Gerst retained Howard J.
has the objective of bringing about an
been critically flawed in two respects.
Needle and Sarah C. King for an initial
economic benefit to the participants, the
First, the court of appeals exaggerated
counsel fee, with additional fees on a
courts must characterize the agreement
the significance of the expressive comcontingency fee basis. A suit was subseas a restraint of trade. The courts are then
ponent in the SCfLA's boycott. The
quently initiated against White, Mindel,
required to apply the per se rules of
Court found nothing unique about the
Clarke and Hill, as well as Hill and Foley
antitrust liability to the agreement and
expressive component of the SCfLA boypersonally, for, Ultimately, malicious
find it violative of both the Sherman Act
cott. Rather, a rule that would require the
prosecution and intentional infliction of
and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
courts to apply the antitrust laws with
emotional distress. At the extensive hear-Thomas J S. Waxter, III
prudence and sensitivity whenever a
ing on the defendant'S pre-trial motion
Needle v. White, Minde~ Clark & HiU:
boycott had an expressive component
for summary judgment, Gerst asserted
TRIAL COURT'S DEOSION TO
"would create a gaping hole in the fabric
that the initiation of criminal charges by
SANCITON REVERSED AS CLEARLY
of those laws." Id. at 780.
the firm was motivated solely by the
ERRONEOUS
Second, the Court found that the court
firm's efforts to collect on its employee
In Needle v. White, Minde4 Clarke &
of appeals was incorrect in their assessfidelity insurance policy, and resulted in
Hill, 81 Md. App. 463, 568 A.2d 856
ment of the antitrust laws. Id. at 779. The
her emotional distress. Conversely, the
(1990), the Court of Special Appeals of
Court criticized the court of appeals' asdefendants argued that Gerst instituted
Maryland held that the trial court's decisumption that the per se rule against
her civil action as retaliation for the crimto impose over $143,000 in sancsion
price-fIXing and boycotts "is only a rule
inal charges filed against her. The motion
tions, pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341,
of 'administrative convenience and effiwas denied.
was
clearly erroneous. After reviewing all
ciency,' and not a statutory command."
The case proceeded to trial where the
the evidence in the underlying suit, the
Id. at 780. While the Court conceded that
issues were whether the law firm insticourt held that neither of the plaintiff's
the per se rules of liability were in part
tuted a criminal proceeding against Gerst
attorneys, nor their client, lacked the
justified by administrative convenience,
without probable cause for a purpose
substantial justification required to bring
the per se rules "reflect a long-standing
other than bringing an offender to jussuit, nor had they brought the suit in bad
judgment that the prohibited practices
tice, and whether, as a result, Gerst suffaith. An attorney need only bring forth a
by their nature have a 'substantial potenfered emotional distress. Needle, 81 Md.
colorable claim to avoid the imposition
tial for impact on competition.'" Id.
App. 467, 568 A.2d at 858. Conflicting
of sanctions, while a court cannot use the
(quotingjefferson Parish Hospital Distestimony was heard on the procedure of
benefit of hindsight to determine the
trictNo.2v.Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,16(1984)).
cash withdrawals and the ultimate desticlaim's merits.
As Justice Douglas stated in a footnote to
nation of the funds in question. DefenAfter a thirteen-year term of employUnited States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
dants renewed their motion for summary
ment, Carolyn Gerst was amicably termi310 U.S. 150 (1940), "whatever ecojudgment at the close of Gerst's case and
nated from her position as a bookkeeper
nomic justifications particular price-fixagain at the conclusion of all the evifor the law firm of White , Mindel, Clarke
ing agreements may be thought to have,
dence. The trial court denied the former
and Hill. According to the firm, Gerst was
the law does not permit an inquiry into
and reserved ruling on the latter.
discharged simply because a replacetheir reasonableness. They are all banned
The issues, including whether Gerst
ment could do a better job. Yet her embecause of their actual or potential threat
stole money from the defendants, were
ployers subsequently discovered, among
to the central nervous system of the econsubmitted to the jury. The jury decided
other discrepancies, that approximately
omy." F. T. C 110 S. Ct. at 781-82 (quoting
that the defendants had a reasonable be$203,000 had been withdrawn from one
Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 225-26.
lief that Gerst took the money and that
of the firm's accounts, coinciding with
The Court also conceded that some
they did not report the matter to the
Gerst's fmal year of employment. Thus,
boycotts and some price-fIXing agreepolice with ill will or with a reckless
the firm instructed John Foley, a member
ments were more injurious to competidisregard for the truth. Additionally, the
of the firm, to file a claim for reimbursetion than others, but held that the court
jury found that Gerst suffered emotional
ment with the insurance company with
of appeals' assumption that absent proof
distress due to the filing of the police
whom they maintained a $100,000 emof market power the SCfLA boycott was
report, but that it was not severe, and that
ployee fidelity policy. The claim asserted
harmless, was inconsistent with the
Gerst did not steal the money. Id. at 468,
that the loss resulted from dishonest or
course of the Supreme Court's antitrust
568 A.2d at 858. Thus, a judgment was
fraudulent acts by Gerst. Additionally, a
jurisprudence.Id. at782. Here, there was
entered for the defendants.
complaint against Gerst was filed with
sufficient testimony to demonstrate that
Immediately following the verdict, the
the police, satisfying a condition of recovthe boycott produced a crisis in the
court, sua sponte, scheduled a sanctions
ery under the policy. The full $100,000
District's criminal justice system which
hearing on the issue of Maryland Rule
was eventually remitted to the firm,
achieved the SCfLA's economic goal.
1-341, Bad Faith - Unjustified Proceedwhile Gerst was charged with embezzleThus, the Supreme Court reversed the
ings. Id. Although having only allowed
ment.
court of appeals' decision creating an
three business days in between, the court
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impose sanctions based upon bad faith,
was clearly established, and once for lack
denied Gerst, Needle and King's request
"clear evidence that the action [was] enfor additional time to prepare and seek
of substantial justification where the artirely without color and taken for other
separate counsel. Needle and King apguments asserted had been repeatedly
improper purposes amounting to bad
peared at the hearing representing both
rejected in previous cases. Id. at 471,
faith" was required, and that was not the
568 A.2d at 860.
themselves and Gerst.
case here. Id.
The court then turned to Needle and
After conducting post-trial factfinding,
King and the issue of substantial justificaThe court then turned to the issue of
the trial judge imposed monetary sancthe Gerst sanctions which the trial court
tion grounded in questions of client credtions of $121,369.14 upon Gerst and
imposed, making no distinction between
ibility. The court noted that both
$21,748.00 upon Needle and King to be
attorneys testified that they believed in
her actions and those of her counsel's. Id.
paid to the defendants. [d. at 465, 568
As for whether substantial justification
Gerst's protestations of innocence. "A
A.2d at 857. In a 21-page Memorandum
subjective belief in one's client," the
existed, the court again turned to the
Opinion, the trial court stated that:
court stated, "standing alone, should not
"fairly debatable" test and stated that it
[T]he court is clearly convinced that
be a bar to the imposition of sanctions.
was "an attorney's call" involving "analythis suit was brought by the plaintiff
because of her ill will and hostility
Where that belief is supported by articusis of the legal arguments, theories of
toward [the defendants]. Further,
lated facts supporting the subjective
recovery, and other decisions requiring
that she felt that she had nothing to
opinion, however, the rule is otherwise."
the expertise of trained professionals."
lose by bringing this suit but beId. at 473, 568 A.2d at 861. Moreover, the
Id. Thus, the court held that judicial
lieved that if she were successful she
review of the issue should focus on the
rule "does not and was never incould reap a windfall from the detended ... to require an attorney to pass
actions of attorneys rather than their clifendants. This court finds as a fact
judgment on the credibility of his client
ents.Id.
that this suit was brought and conunder the threat of monetary sanction in
The court found that the charge of bad
tinued in bad faith and without subthe event that either a jury or judge arfaith was the primary basis for sanctionstantial justification. The plaintiff
ing Gerst in that the trial court believed
rives at a different conclusion as to credknew that this action was frivolous.
ibility." [d.
that Gerst felt she had "nothing to lose"
In addition, this court is clearly conRather,
the
test
in
Maryland
for
in bringing the action, but might instead
vinced that at the very latest, when
whether
substantial
justification
is
estab"reap a windfall from the defendants." Id.
the case was called for trial on Seplished
is
whether
"the
legal
position
at
474-75,568 A.2d at 862. Furthermore,
tember 6, 1988, the plaintiffs attortaken by counsel is 'fairly debatable,'"
the trial court found that she had not
neys knew that there was no
and not "whether a court or jury later
suffiCiently proven either claim. Id. at
evidence to support the plaintiffs
believes that the client lacks credibility."
475, 568 A.2d at 862. Yet the court of
allegations. Further, they knew or
Id. (citing Newman v. ReiUy, 314 Md.
special appeals found that based on the
reasonably should have known that
evidence and conflicting testimony, a
364, 550 A.2d 959 (988); ABA Section
there was no justification in continof Litigation, Sanctions (2d Ed. 1988)).
prima facie case was raised for both mauing this litigation and causing the
defendants to incur additional delicious prosecution and intentional inflicThe federal courts, the court noted,
fense costs.
adopted an even more stringent, objection of emotional distress. Thus, the
Id. at 469, 568A.2dat859. On appeal,
court concluded that whether the eletive standard where if the attorney could
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
not form a reasonable belief as to the
ments were proven was for a jury to
limited its review to a single issue validity of what is asserted at trial, sancdecide.Id.
whether the trial court's decision was
tions would be imposed. Id.
Finally, the court addressed the trial
clearly erroneous. Id. at 470, 568 A.2d at
After reviewing the information availcourt's role when determining sanctions
able to the two attorneys, the conflicting
and focused first on the use of judicial
859.
The court began its analysis by discusstestimony, and Gerst's acquittal, the
hindsight. Relying on cases which reing the objectives and dangers of Marycourt disagreed with the trial court's beversed decisions to sanction, the court
land Rule 1-341. The rule allows a trial
lief that no supporting evidence existed
stated that in Maryland, judicial hindsight
court to impose sanctions for conduct in
as to their client's credibility. Rather, the
may not be used to determine whether
bad faith or without substantial justificacourt held that "by either an articulated
substantial justification exists. Id. at 476,
tion whether by maintaining or defendsubjective belief or by a more rigorous
568 A.2d 862.Q3. Moreover, a trial attoring a proceeding. The offending party,
ney should not be required to act as a trier
objective standard, Needle and King
the advising attorney, or both may be
could not reasonably be held to have
of fact or judge, but need only have a
required to pay the adverse party's costs
proceeded without substantial justifica"reasonable basis for believing that a case
of the proceeding and any reasonable
tion." Id.
will generate a factual issue for the factattorney's fees incurred. The objective:
Next, the court considered the trial
finder at trial." Id. at 476, 568 A.2d 863.
eliminating litigant or counsel abuses of
This reasoning was directly in line with
court's charge of bad faith on the part of
the judicial process by initiating or conthe general principle that one need only
Needle and King in proceeding to trial.
tinuing meritless claims. The dangers:
assert a colorable claim to avoid the imThe court noted that although Maryland
the chilling effect on all the parties conhad yet to defme bad faith in terms of
pOSition of sanctions; an attorney must
cerned, as well as limiting free access to
Rule 1-341, the Supreme Court had preeither make a good faith argument on the
the courts, for colorable claims, without
merits of the action, or support it by a
viously defined the term as actions mainfear of penalty over and above defeat. Id.
tained "vexatiously, wantonly or for
good faith argument for an extension,
oppressive reasons." Id. (quoting Roadat 470, 568 A.2d at 859.Qo.
modification, or reversal of existing law.
The court noted that since the rule's
Id. at 477, 568 A.2d at 863.
way Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752
(1980)). Cases addressing the issue in
adoption in 1984, it had been used fre10 the instant case, the trial court had
Maryland seemed to indicate that only
quently, and in 1988 alone, had been
constructively denied appellees' motion
addressed at the appellate level at least
"egregious behavior" would support
for judgment three times, establishing
six different times. Of those cases, sancsuch a holding. Id. at 474, 568 A.2d at
that it had thrice recognized the existions were upheld only once where fraud . 861. Thus, the court held that in order to
tence of disputed questions of fact. It was
2~The Law Forum /20.3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

only after a verdict was returned that the
trial court "exercising its perceived
power to engage in judicial hindsight,
stated that it should never have permitted the case to continue and sua sponte
embarked on the sanctions phase of the
trial." Id. at 478, 568 A.2d at 863.
Although the court conceded that justified sanctions could be imposed for
conduct during the trial, such as dilatory
tactics or abusive conduct, no such allegations were ever made. Id. at 479,568
A.2d at 864. Accordingly, the court held
that because the evidence was sufficiently debatable to deny motions
throughout the trial, it was sufficient to
justify Gerst in bringing and continuing
her case. Id. Thus, the court of special
appeals concluded that the trial court's
decision was clearly erroneous. Id. at
479-80, 568 A.2d at 864.
In so ruling, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland once again clearly discouraged the excessive use of Rule 1-341
sanctions. Such use can only impose a
chilling effect on a plaintiff's right to
court access, while providing an uncertain environment for attorneys to act. As
the court opined, Rule 1-341 should only
be used in the most extreme of instances
when a claim is clearly meritless and
intended to remedy only intentional misconduct.
- Vasiliki Papaioannou

Pavelic & leFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group: SANCTIONS FOR VlOIATIONOFHID~RurnOF~

PROCEDURE 11 ONLY APPLY TO

TIlE INDIVIDUAL SIGNER
In Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989),
the United States Supreme Court held
that sanctions provided by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11 ("Rule 11") only
applied to the attorney who signed a
paper in violation of Rule 11, even if the
attorney explicitly signed on behalf of his
fIrm.
On behalf of Northern ]. Calloway,
attorney Ray 1. leFlore brought a willful
copyright infringment claim in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Marvel
Entertainment Group ("Marvel"). In an
amended complaint, Calloway alleged
that Marvel forged his signature. After
initiation of the claim, leFlore formed the
law partnership ofPavelic & leFlore with
Radovan Pavelic. Several papers relying
on the allegation of forgery were signed:
"Pavelic & leFlore
By /s/ Ray 1. leFlore
(A Member of the Firm)
Attorneys for Plaintiff. "

Id. at 457. The district court found that
these papers were in violation of Rule 11
and imposed a sanction in the amount of
$100,000 against Pavelic & leFlore.
Upon a motion by Radovan Pavelic, the
district court shifted half of the sanction
from the fIrm to LeFlore, because the fum
did not exist during the major part of the
litigation. However, the district court rejected Pavelic's contention that Rule 11
only empowered the court to impose the
sanction upon LeFlore and not upon the
fum. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affIrmed the sanction. The Second Circuit's decision directly conflicted
with a Fifth Circuit holding that authorized Rule 11 sanctions against only the
individual signers. Id. at 458 citing Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808
F.2d 1119, 1128-30 (1987)).
Pavelic appealed to the United States
Supreme Court and was granted certiorari. In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the
Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit and
reversed the Second Circuit. In interpreting Rule 11, the Court relied on the plain
meaning of the rule. Pavelic & LeFlore,
110 S. Ct. at 458 (citing Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446U.S. 740, 750n.9(1980)).
Where a pleading, motion, or other
paper violates Rule 11, the rule requires
the trial court to "impose upon the person who signed it . . . an appropriate
sanction." Id. The Court noted that if
viewed in isolation, the phrase "person
who signed" is ambiguous. Id. However,
upon reading the phrase in the entire
context of Rule 11, the Court reasoned
that since Rule 11 begins "with a requirement of individual signature, and then
proceed [s] to discuss the import and consequences of signature, ... references to
the signature in the later portions must
reasonably be thought to connote the
individual signer mentioned at the outset." Id.
In rejecting Marvel's contention that
the legal principles of partnership and
agency should apply, the Court emphasized that Rule 11 established a duty that
an attorney could not delegate. Id. at 459.
The Court also held that although LeFlore
explicitly signed on behalf of his fIrm, the
sanction only applied to leFlore individually. The Court reasoned that a signature
on behalf of a fum could not comply with
the fIrst sentence of Rule 11, since it
requires papers to be signed "by at least
one attorney of record in the attorney's
individual name." Id. The Court noted
that in the past, the preferred practice for
an attorney was to sign on his own behalf
with the name of his fIrm beneath. Id.
(citing Gavit, The New FederalRules and
State Procedure, 25 A.B.A.). 367, 371
(1939)).

Although a law fum may have more
funds than an individual signer, the Court
noted that the purpose of the sanction
was punishment rather than reimbursement. The Court also noted that the function "of Rule 11 as a whole is to bring
home to the individual signer his personal, nondelegable responsibility." Id.
at 460. Moreover, the Supreme Court
determined that holding an individual
signer personally liable provides a greater
economic deterrent. Id.
In a lone dissent, Justice Marshall argued that Rule 11 sanctions can apply to
a law fum. At fIrst, the rule uses the term
"signer," but later in its discussion of
sanctions, the rule uses the phrase "the
person who signed." Id. at 461 (Marshall,
]., dissenting). The dissent noted that in
the context of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, one could reasonably assume
that the drafters meant the term "person"
to include partnerships and professional
corporations. Id. (Marshall, )., dissenting) (citing 5 u.s.c. § 551 (2); NY. Partnership Law § 2 (McKinney 1988)).
Recognizing that the sanction should be
tailored to each situation, Justice Marshall opined that Rule 11 allowed the trial
judge to decide whether sanctions
would more properly be applied to the
attorney or his law fum. Id. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall reasoned that individual accountability may
be heightened if an attorney's negligence
also subjected his law fIrm to liability. Id.
at 461-62 (Marshall,]., dissenting).
In holding that Rule 11 sanctions apply
only to the attorney who signs a paper in
violation of the rule, the United States
Supreme Court precluded the application of Rule 11 sanctions to law firms. As
a result, parties may fmd it more difficult
to collect reimbursement for expenses
caused by Rule 11 violations, but personal liability may provide a greater incentive for attorneys to comply with Rule
11.
-Richard E. Guida

Simpler v. State: POllCE MAY NOT

FRISK A SUSPECf AS A MATI'ER OF
ROUI1NE CAIDlON, TIJERE MUST BE
A REASONABLE SUSPIOON TIIAT
THE SUSPECf IS ARMED AND DANGEROUS
In Simpler v. State, 318 Md. 311, 568
A.2d 22 (1990) the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held the seizure of paraphernalia with marijuana residue was unconstitutional where the suspect was frisked
without reasonable suspicion that he was
armed and dangerous.
On the evening of May 8, 1987, Sergeant Wassmer (Wassmer), of the Cecil
County Sheriff's Department, and a
young explorer scout were on routine
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